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A resurgence of interest in the role of banks in the transmission of
monetary policy has resulted in a spate of theoretical and empirical
studies. These studies have established that, under certain conditions,
the traditional transmission mechanism for monetary policy ("the
money view") may be augmented through changes in the supply of
bank loans ("the lending view"). Because both the money view and the
lending view operate through the banking sector, the health of the
banking system, insofar as it affects bank behavior, is an important
factor in the transmission of monetary policy. It affects both the nature
and the size of bank responses to shifts in monetary policy, with
particular relevance for the bank lending channel.
The traditional description of monetary policy generally emphasizes
the reserve requirement constraint on banks. In this story, banks are an
important link in the transmission of monetary policy because changes
in bank reserves influence the quantity of reservable deposits held by
banks. Because banks rarely hold significant excess reserves, the resel~ce
requirement constraint typically is considered to be binding at all times.
However, a second constraint on banks, the capital constraint, may be
more important in accounting for the variability in the magnitude of the
effect of monetary policy over time. The extent to which a capital
constraint is binding, unlike the reserve requirement, is likely to vary
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over time and across regions, since it depends on a variety of factors
such as regulatory shocks, capital shocks, and business conditions.1
The capital constraint is likely to have its greatest effect on bank
lending, and thus be particularly important for the lending channel of
monetary policy. For example, a bank facing a binding capital-to-asset
ratio will be unable to expand its assets in response to an easing of
monetary policy, even if loan demand increases with the ease in policy,
since it is a shortage of capital, not reserves, that is preventing the bank
from increasing its lending. Thus, to the extent that a lending channel
is important, it is likely to be short-circuited for banks facing a binding
capital constraint that can insulate the banks’ loan portfolios from
reserve shocks.
We show that capital-constrained banks should respond to both
monetary policy and bank capital shocks quite differently from uncon-
strained banks. In particular, when banks are capital-constrained, the
lending channel is eliminated, because decreases in bank reserves that
decrease transactions deposits are exactly offset by an increase in
nontransactions deposits. Furthermore, our simple model predicts that
loans by capital-constrained banks will rise in response to a tightening of
monetary policy, with the liability side of the balance sheet unchanged
and both reserves and securities declining. On the other hand, when
banks are unconstrained, changes in nontransactions deposits do not
exactly offset changes in transactions deposits, and loans should decrease
in response to a tightening of monetary policy. We find some empirical
evidence, consistent with the implications of the model, supporting the
view that the effects of a lending channel and, more broadly, monetary
policy, may vary over time as conditions in the banking sector change.
The first section of this paper describes the lending view and
illustrates why New England banks may be a particularly fertile ground
for examining the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy.
The second section provides a simple one-period model that illustrates
why capital-constrained banks should not be expected to contribute to a
separate lending channel. The model implies that a constrained bank
should react differently to a monetary shock or a capital shock than
would an unconstrained bank (or the constrained bank itself, when it
was Unconstrained). The third section provides an empirical test of the
implications of the model and finds evidence of portfolio shifts by
unconstrained banks that are consistent with the implications of a
lending channel. This section also highlights the finding that empirical
1 Romer and Romer (1993) have argued that monetary policy may have been less
effective recently because tighter monetary policy was not combined with credit actions, as
it frequently had been in the past. The explanation in this paper differs;in that it
emphasizes not the absence of credit actions, but rather the extent of binding capital
constraints at banks, as distinguishing the early 1990s from earlier periods.BANK LENDING AND TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY 49
investigations of the impact of monetary policy that do not control for
capital-constrained banks potentially can provide misleading results.
The final section offers some conclusions and suggests some areas for
further research.
OVERVIEW OF THE LENDING CHANNEL
Because a number of previous articles have highlighted the differ-
ences between the money channel and the lending channel (for exam-
ple, Romer and Romer 1990; Kashyap and Stein 1994; Miron, Romer,
and Weil 1994), we will provide only a brief overview. Following the
overview, we will show that capital at New England banks followed a
pattern during the most recent recession that differs both from the
national pattern during that recession and from the New England
pattern during prior recessions. Furthermore, perhaps as a consequence
of the widespread capital shocks, New England banks have exhibited
patterns in their asset and liability holdings that differ from those over
previous business cycles. By exploiting these differences, we may be
able to better understand how the health of the banking system may
alter the effectiveness of monetary policy.
The sources of an independent lending channel can be understood
best by considering a simple bank balance sheet (Figure 1A). Consider a
bank whose only assets are reserves and securities, and whose only
liabilities are (reservable) transactions deposits and capital. Open market
operations that decrease reserves will cause interest rates to rise and
induce individuals and firms to hold fewer transactions deposits until
transactions deposits have declined sufficiently to bring required re-
serves back into line with available reserves, with banks holding fewer
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bonds and individuals holding more. Thus, the transmission mecha-
nism operates solely through the user cost of capital, as interest rates
rise to equate money demand and money supply. This is commonly
called the traditional "money view."
An additional channel may arise with a more complicated financial
intermediary, as shown in Figure lB. This more complicated intermedi-
ary has three assets: reserves, securities, and loans. It also has three
liabilities: (reservable) transactions deposits, (nonreservable) nontrans-
actions deposits, and capital. In this case, an open market operation that
decreases reserves potentially can have additional effects that operate
through the asset side of the bank balance sheet. The decrease in
reserves decreases transactions deposits, and this, if not offset by an
increase in nontransactions deposits or a decrease in securities holdings,
will result in a decrease in loans. Thus, a necessary condition for the
lending channel to operate is that loans not be insulated from monetary
policy changes by banks altering their nontransactions deposits and
securities sufficiently to offset completely any change in their transac-
tions deposits. It is this portfolio behavior that is the focus of this paper.
That monetary policy alters loan supply is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the lending view. For the lending view to be
operational, two other conditions must also be met. (See Kashyap and
Stein (1994) for a detailed discussion of these requirements.) First,
securities and bank loans must not be considered, by at least some firms,
perfect substitutes as sources of funds. That is, some firms can be
deemed to be bank-dependent for their credit needs, so that a change in
the supply of bank loans has an impact on the real activities of firms.
This proposition will be explored by other papers at this conference and
has developed a significant academic literature in its own right (for
example, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; Gertler and Gilchrist
1994; Gertler and Hubbard 1988; Oliner and Rudebusch 1993). A second
additional condition required for monetary policy to have real effects on
the economy is that prices must be sticky, in order to prevent monetary
policy from being neutral. This condition is critical for both the money
and the lending views. While both of these additional conditions are
critical for an operational lending channel, this paper will not consider
them further but will explore only whether bank portfolio reactions to
changes in monetary policy are consistent with the lending view.
Most empirical studies examining bank portfolio reactions to mon-
etary policy have used vector autoregression techniques to examine the
impact on lending of a change in monetary policy (for example,
Bernanke and Blinder 1992). While such papers show that loans decline
with a lag after a tightening of monetary policy, they cannot disentangle
declines resulting from reduced loan demand from declines resulting
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come this problem in aggregate data by distinguishing between large
and small banks. Based on capital market imperfections that affect the
ability of banks to attract marginal sources of financing, their argument
states that supply effects may occur disproportionately at small banks.
Using micro banking data aggregated into different bank-size categories,
they find evidence consistent with their hypothesis that the effects of
monetary policy tightening are largest at small banks, which make
primarily small business loans. However, if small business activity is
disproportionately (relative to larger firms) affected by monetary policy
tightening, this result still could reflect changes in loan demand rather
than loan supply.
Kashyap and Stein (1995) recognize that the lending channel could
be significantly reduced by banks being capital-constrained, but they
find no evidence of this effect in their data. Figure 2, which presents
capital-to-asset ratios for commercial banks in the United States and in
New England from 1960:II to 1994:IV, shows why their results are
unlikely to be affected by the capital crunch in the early 1990s. For the
nation as a whole, capital ratios fell during the 1960s and 1970s, before
gradually increasing in the 1980s and increasing more rapidly in the
1990s. However, capital ratios nationwide appear to be relatively insen-
sitive to the business cycle; not only did they show no dramatic decline
in the past recession, but they actually continued to increase.
While the general pattern of the New England bank capital ratio is
similar to the national aggregate until the late 1980s, the two series differ
sharply thereafter. Beginning in 1989, the capital ratio for New England
banks declines dramatically, followed by a very steep increase in the
1990s. Thus, the capital crunch is likely to be reflected in data for New
England, where capital-constrained banks represented a significant
share of banks during the last recession, but not in aggregate national
data, which are likely to be dominated by data for unconstrained banks.
To the extent that the lending channel is severed for capital-constrained
banks, differences between the portfolio reactions of constrained and
unconstrained banks may best be tested using New England data.
This supposition is further supported by Figure 3, which shows the
four-quarter change in real transactions deposits and nontransactions
deposits (scaled by assets) at New England commercial banks. A
necessary condition for the lending channel is that changes in non-
transactions deposits not offset the changes in transactions deposits
induced by changes in monetary policy. In fact, Romer and Romer
(1990) have argued that the lending channel is unlikely to be supported
because banks can offset changes in transactions deposits by substitut-
ing funds from alternative sources (in our model, nontransactions
deposits) relatively costlessly. However, Figure 3 shows no clear pattern
of offsetting changes in transactions and nontransactions deposits in52 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren
Figure 2
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New England.2 Furthermore, the figure shows that the behavior of bank
deposits in New England was very different in the 1990s relative to
earlier periods. In no previous recovery had nontransactions deposits
exhibited a sustained decline at New England commercial banks. In the
most recent episode, however, they showed a very substantial decline,
one that more than offset the increase in transactions deposits as the
federal funds target interest rate was reduced by the Federal Reserve in
the early 1990s.
The recession in 1974 resulted in higher unemployment rates in
New England than those of the 1990 recession, while the 1982 recession
had a peak unemployment rate similar to that of the 1990 recession.
However, the behavior of bank nontransactions deposits associated
with the 1990 recession was quite different from that in either of the two
2 The decline in nontransactions deposits in the late 1970s, the second largest shown
in the figure, coincides with the introduction of NOW accounts in New England. Thus, it
likely reflects the resulting substitutions out of nontransactions deposits and into NOW
accounts, rather than being a consequence of a change in monetary policy.BANK LENDING AND TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY 53
Figure 3
FOUR-QUARTER CHANGE IN REAL TRANSACTIONS AND
REAL NONTRANSACTIONS DEPOSITS (SCALED BY
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earlier recessions. As Figure 2 shows, this much more dramatic decline
coincides with a large drop in bank capital, at a time when over 40
percent of bank assets in New England were held by banks under formal
regulatory constraints (Peek and Rosengren 1995c). Changes in the
proportions of constrained and unconstrained banks over time, in
combination with the fact that constrained and unconstrained banks
respond differently to changes in monetary policy, may help explain
why this portfolio shift in bank deposits differed from earlier periods.
Recent movements in assets as well as liabilities at New England
banks have differed from those in previous business cycles. Figure 4
shows the four-quarter change in real loans and securities (scaled by
assets) at New England commercial banks. Bank loans in New England
during the most recent cycle exhibited a much larger and more sustained
decline that continued well after the bottom of the recession. Thus,
while monetary ease appears to have stimulated lending in earlier
recoveries, it failed to stem the significant declines in lending that
continued through 1992 in New England. This evidence supports the
view that bank lending may not respond to monetary ease at capital-
constrained banks, but does react at banks that are unconstrained.54 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren
Figure 4
FOUR-QUARTER CHANGE IN REAL SECURITIES AND REAL
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These figures also provide some evidence that bank portfolio
behavior may differ between constrained and unconstrained banks and
that New England may be a particularly fruitful place to look for these
differences. The next section provides a theoretical model that examines
why the strength of monetary policy is likely to be weakened when
banks face binding capital constraints.
A SIMPLE MODEL OF BANK BEHAVIOR
To establish how the size of the effect of monetary policy is likely to
be affected by capital-constrained banks, we provide a highly simplified
one-period model of banks that is a variant of a model in Peek and
Rosengren (1995a). The bank is assumed to have three assets, loans (L),
securities (S), and reserves (R), and three categories of liabilities, bank
capital (K), transactions deposits (DD), and nontransactions deposits (CD).
The balance sheet constraint requires that total assets must equal
total liabilities.
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On the liability side of the balance sheet, bank capital is assumed to be
fixed in the short run. Transactions deposits are assumed to be inversely
related to the federal funds rate (rF). A general rise in market rates
increases the opportunity cost of holding such deposits, causing bank
customers to reduce their holdings of transactions deposits and shift
into alternative assets paying market-related interest rates. Given that
transactions accounts are tied to check-clearing services and conve-
nience, this market tends to be imperfectly competitive. Banks set
imperfectly competitive retail deposit interest rates (for example, NOW
accounts) so as to maximize their monopoly rents from issuing these
deposits. Thus, the quantity of imperfectly competitive transactions
deposits can be treated as determined by profit-maximizing interest-rate
setting, unrelated to the bank’s overall need for funding.
DD=ao-a~rv (2)
Nontransactions accounts, on the other hand, serve as the marginal
source of funds to the bank. We assume that a bank can expand total
deposits by offering an interest rate on nontransactions deposits (ro)
greater than the mean rate in its market (ro). Offering a deposit rate
greater than the mean deposit rate will draw funds not only from other
banks inside and outside the banking region but also from financial
instruments that are close substitutes, such as money market mutual
funds and Treasury securities. The competitive nature of this market
would suggest that the value of fl, the sensitivity of nontransactions
deposit inflows or outflows to changes in the bank’s interest rate on
such deposits, would be large.
(3)
On the asset side of the balance sheet, banks must hold reserves
equal to their reserve requirement ratio (a) times their transactions
deposits. We assume that banks hold no excess reserves. Securities are
assumed to be a fixed proportion of transactions deposits (h) net of
reserves. This is done in order to capture a buffer stock model for
securities, whereby banks maintain securities for liquidity in the event of
large withdrawals of transactions deposits.
R=aDD (4)
S =ho+hlDD-R (5)
The bank loan market is assumed to be imperfectly competitive. A
bank can increase (decrease) its loan volume by offering aloan rate (rL)
lower (higher) than the mean loan rate in its market (rL)o Given the
uniqueness of bank loans as a source of financing to many firms (see, for56 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren
example, James 1987), the value of gl, the sensitivity of loan demand to
a change in the bank’s loan interest rate, is likely to be large.
L = go - gl(rL -- ~) (6)
The market interest rates on nontransactions deposits, loans, and
securities are each assumed to be a function of market-specific effects
and an effect related to the federal funds rate.
~ = bo + CrF (7)
rL = CO+ ~brF (8)
Fs = e0+ CrF (9)
To simplify the algebra, we assume that each market rate increases by
the same amount (¢) for a given change in the federal funds rate.
Finally, bank behavior may be further constrained by the required
capital-to-asset ratio (/~).3
K >- t~ (R + S + L) = I-~ (K + DD + CD) (10)
Banks are assumed to maximize profits (~r). Because our profit
function abstracts from fee income and overhead costs, total profits are
simply the sum of interest income on loans (rLL) net of loan losses (OL)
and interest received from securities holdings (rsS), minus both interest
paid on transactions deposits (rDDDD) and interest paid on nontransac-
tions deposits (rDCD). Thus, profits are:
~r = (rL -- O)L + FsS - rDDDD -- rDCD. (11)
Using equations (1) to (9) to eliminate R, DD, L, S, rD, rL, and the
three market interest rates from equations (10) and (11), the maximiza-
tion problem can be stated as a Lagrangian equation, maximizing the
profit function with the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the capital
ratio constraint. The Lagrangian equation is maximized with respect
to CD to obtain the first-order conditions.4 Next, we use the first-order
conditions to solve for CD in both the constrained and the uncon-
3 In this paper, we focus only on leverage ratio thresholds, for two reasons. First,
risk-based capital ratios are not available before 1990. Second, for the period in New
England under study here, leverage ratios rather than risk-based capital ratios tended to
be the binding constraint on capital-constrained banks. This is consistent with evidence on
nationwide samples that leverage ratios and not risk-based capital ratios affected bank
behavior (for example, Hancock and Wilcox 1994).
4 Of course, banks choose the level of CD by choosing rD. However, because we are
interested in quantifies rather than interest rates, it is more direct to state the optimization
problem in terms of choosing CD.BANK LENDING AND TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY 57
strained cases. This process can be repeated for the other variable of
particular interest, loans. The testable hypotheses are then obtained by
taking derivatives of the CD and the loan equations with respect to the
federal funds rate and to bank capital.
It can easily be shown that when the capital constraint is binding,
the following conditions will hold.




~ = al > 0 (13)
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-- = -- > 0 (16)
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When the capital constraint is binding, an increase in capital and an
increase in the federal funds rate each increase nontransactions depos-
its. However, because a change in the federal funds rate causes off-
setting changes in transactions and nontransactions deposits, total
deposits are unchanged. One of the conditions of the lending view is
violated: The contractionary (expansionary) effects of monetary policy
on transactions deposits are completely offset by increases (decreases) in
nontransactions deposits. Thus, the impact of a change in monetary
policy will be much weaker when a substantial share of banks are capital
constrained.
In fact, the binding constraint on bank capital causes loans to be
positively related to the federal funds rate, as well as to bank capital. In
this model, contractionary monetary policy actually increases bank
loans. With the fall in reserves, transactions deposits fall, which in turn
causes securities holdings to decline. With no change on the liability side
of the bank balance sheet, the reduction in reserves and securities
induces an increase in loans.
The unconstrained case generates results substantially different
from those of the constrained case.
-h =     < 0               (17) dK h + gl58 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren
dCD Flal(1- hl)
> 0, assuming hi < 1           (18) dr~    h + g~
d(total deposits) - al(g~ + flhl)
< 0         (19)
drF f~ + gl
dL    g~
-- = -- > 0 (20) dK fl + gl
dL - g1(1 - hi)a1
< 0, assuming h~ < 1          (21)
drF h + gl
Nontransactions deposits increase with a decline in capital, in contrast
to the decline that occurs in the constrained case, as banks substitute
nontransactions deposits for some of their lost capital. Note that only
the capital requirement matters for the reaction of nontransactions
deposits to a capital shock in the constrained case, while only the
interest sensitivities of both nontransactions deposits and loans (and not
the required capital ratio) affect the reaction of nontransactions deposits
to a capital shock in the unconstrained case.
For a monetary policy shock, these two interest sensitivities again
play a key role in the unconstrained case, but are absent in the capital-
constrained case. Nontransactions deposits increase with an increase in
the federal funds rate as long as h1 is less than 1. This is a reasonable
assumption, given that only a proportion of deposits would be held in
liquid form to cover possible withdrawals of transactions deposits. Note
that while nontransactions deposits are positively related to federal funds
changes in both the constrained and unconstrained cases, the effect is
much smaller in the unconstrained case. Total deposits now decrease
with an increase in the federal funds rate. Thus, unlike the constrained
case, the effect of a monetary policy shock is only partially offset by a
change in nontransactions deposits.
For loans, the results also differ. With a decrease in capital, loans
decline, but less than one-for-one. In contrast, in the constrained case,
the decline is the inverse of the capital requirement, which should be
substantially greater than 1. With an increase in the federal funds rate,
loans decline as long as hi is less than 1. Again, this is opposite to the
result obtained in the constrained case. And, just as with the response
of nontransactions deposits, the interest sensitivities of both nontrans-
actions deposits and loans are important determinants of the magnitude
of the response of loans to a change in the federal funds rate in the
unconstrained case, but play no role when banks are capital-constrained.
Thus, this simple model yields several testable hypotheses concern-
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the possible pitfalls of failing to control for both capital shocks and
monetary policy shocks:
1. Nontransactions deposits at constrained banks should respond
more to a change in the federal funds rate than nontransactions
deposits at unconstrained banks.
2. Total deposits at constrained banks should be unaffected by
changes in the federal funds rate, while total deposits at uncon-
strained banks should be negatively related to changes in the
federal funds rate.
3. Loans at constrained banks should respond positively to changes
in the federal funds rate, while at unconstrained banks the
response should be negative.
4. Loans at constrained banks should respond more to a capital
shock than loans at unconstrained banks.
5. Nontransactions deposits at constrained banks should respond
positively to a capital shock, while nontransactions deposits at
unconstrained banks will respond negatively to a capital shock.
Additional implications could be derived if one were to assume that
bank size is related to the sensitivity of deposits and loans to changes in
a bank’s interest rates. Kashyap and Stein (1994) argue that large and
small banks face different market conditions in raising marginal sources
of funding (nontransactions deposits). If so, fl will be positively related
to the size of the bank. In the constrained case, neither the results for
nontransactions deposits nor those for loans should be affected by
differences in fl. In the unconstrained case, however, nontransactions
deposits at larger banks will be more responsive to changes in the
federal funds rate compared to those at smaller banks, and loans at
larger banks will be less responsive (see equations 18 and 21).
Along these same lines, another possibility is that loans at large
banks, whose borrowers have greater access to national credit markets,
have greater sensitivity to changes in loan rates than loans at smaller banks.
This implies that gl will be larger for larger banks. This greater loan rate
sensitivity has no impact on the responses to federal funds rate changes in
the constrained case. However, in the unconstrained case, nontransactions
deposits at larger banks will be less responsive to changes in the federal
funds rate than those at smaller banks, and loans will be more responsive.
Larger values of fz and gz are each associated with larger banks, yet
they have opposite effects on the magnitude of the response to changes
in the federal funds rate of both transactions deposits and loans, making
the net effect ambiguous. Thus, focusing on differing responses by large
and small banks, as emphasized in Kashyap and Stein (1994), may not
provide clear evidence unless one has priors on the magnitudes of the
effects of bank size on the values of f~ and g~. While we have reason to
believe both fl and g~ are large, we have little evidence on their relative60 loe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren
responses to changes in bank size. Thus, the clearest distinctions are
likely to be between capital-constrained and unconstrained banks,
rather than between large and small banks.
EMPIRICAL TESTS
The theoretical model, while highly simplified, indicates that con-
strained and unconstrained banks should respond quite differently to
changes in monetary policy. Banks that are constrained would change
loans in the same direction as movements in the federal funds rate, and
banks that are unconstrained would change loans in the opposite
direction. Thus, we will focus the empirical work on the determinants of
the change in bank loans. The key implication is that the response of
loans to a tightening (an easing) of monetary policy at unconstrained
banks should be to decline (increase) more than at capital-constrained
banks. Thus, as more banks become capital-constrained, we would
expect the thrust of monetary policy passed from the banking sector to
the rest of the economy to be weaker.
The Data
All bank balance sheet data are taken from the quarterly bank Call
Reports. While some of the data series begin quarterly observations as
early as 1972:IV, our regressions span only the 1976:II to 1994:IV period
because of limitations on the availability of some variables and the need
for lagged observations. We limit our sample to commercial banks,
because savings banks reported only semiannually prior to 1984. We
also use bank structure information to identify de novo banks and
merger and acquisition activity, which will cause discontinuities in
individual bank data unrelated to their lending behavior.
To empirically test the above hypotheses requires identifying capi-
tal-constrained and unconstrained banks. We base our categorization on
the presence or absence of a formal regulatory action, supplemented
with information on regulators’ CAMEL ratings of banks. Formal actions
(written agreements and cease and desist orders) are legally enforceable
agreements between regulators and bank management and the board
of directors. For financially troubled banks, these agreements specify
target capital ratios, most commonly a 6 percent leverage ratio (Peek and
Rosengren 1995e).
These are the most severe regulatory actions taken, short of closing
the bank. And, because they are legally enforceable agreements with
civil penalties for noncompliance, banks are likely to alter their behavior
when a formal action is implemented. In fact, Peek and Rosengren
(1995c) have documented that banks do reduce their lending as a result
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occurs discretely at the time of the bank examination that results in the
enforcement action. Furthermore, the imposition of formal regulatory
actions was widespread in New England. At the peak in the early 1990s,
the shares of both bank assets and bank loans in New England com-
mercial and savings banks subject to formal actions exceeded 40 percent.
While formal actions will identify most capital-constrained banks,
Peek and Rosengren (1995d) found that some banks do not receive
formal actions because they are about to be closed or merged with
another bank before the regulator can conclude the agreement. Because
these institutions generally have very low capital, had they continued to
operate as an independent entity they likely would have received a
formal action. In these cases, the formal action information must be
supplemented with supervisory ratings of banks. These ratings of the
financial condition of the banks consider the capital adequacy, asset
quality, management quality, earnings potential, and liquidity of the
institution (CAMEL). The composite CAMEL rating, which can range
from 1 to 5, provides an assessment by examiners of the strength of a
banking institution. Banks with a composite rating of 4 (potential of
failure, performance could impair viability) or 5 (high probability of
failure, critically deficient performance), and some institutions with a
CAMEL rating of 3 (remote probability of failure, flawed performance),
normally will undergo an enforcement action. Thus, we define the set of
constrained banks as those banks either under a formal action or having
a CAMEL 4 or CAMEL 5 rating.
Banks with a composite rating of I (sound in every respect, flawless
performance) and 2 (fundamentally sound, only minor correctable
weaknesses in performance) are resistant to external economic and
financial disturbances and are unlikely to be constrained by regulatory
oversight. Thus, we define an unconstrained bank as any bank not
under a formal action having a CAMEL rating of either 1 or 2. Because
CAMEL 3 institutions not subject to formal actions are neither clearly
constrained nor unconstrained, we do not include this set of banks in
either of our two categories.
While a large share of New England banks were in our constrained
category beginning in 1989, we were able to identify very few such
banks during the period 1977 to 1988. First, information on formal
actions is not publicly available prior to 1989. Second, through much of
this period, fewer than five institutions in New England had a CAMEL
rating of 4 or 5. Thus, the number of constrained institutions is not
sufficient to form a constrained-bank aggregate prior to 1989, greatly
limiting the length of time that can be used for comparisons. Until we
can obtain the information required to expand the sample to include
banks outside of New England, we can compare constrained and uncon-
strained institutions only from 1989:I through 1994:IV. However, be-
cause the large majority of banks in New England were relatively62 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren
healthy during the earlier period, we can form an unconstrained bank
sample from 1977:I through 1994:W.
To form the constrained bank and unconstrained bank aggregate
time series, we must address a number of problems, the most important
being that banks may shift between categories over time. We use a
standard technique to deal with this problem: We calculate the change in
a variable for a given category one quarter at a time, using only data°for
the set of banks in that category in that quarter (see, for example, Gertler
and Gilchrist 1994; Kashyap and Stein 1995). These quarterly changes
are then linked together to form a time series.
Specifically, we use the following procedure. For each quarter, we
first eliminate any bank that underwent structure changes in that
quarter (for example, acquired another bank)or was in its first eight
quarters of existence,s We then categorize as constrained any remaining
bank that is under a formal action or has a CAMEL rating of 4 or 5 at
the beginning of the quarter. To obtain a measure of the change in a
variable, say loans, over the quarter, we sum the change in loans over
the set of currently constrained banks to obtain the change in loans for
constrained banks for that quarter and divide by the sum of beginning-
of-period assets for the set of constrained banks. The quarterly time
series is formed by repeating the calculation, for each quarter in the
sample. This will provide a consistent set of growth rates for each
variable for each bank category, although the individual institutions in a
category will change over time.
This procedure is repeated for the set of unconstrained banks, those
banks that are not de novo banks, have not undergone structure
changes in the quarter, are not under a formal regulatory action, and
have a CAMEL rating of I or 2 at the beginning of the quarter.6 We also
construct data series for a total bank category, all banks that are not in
their first eight quarters of existence and have not undergone structure
changes during the quarter. This category includes not only our sets of
constrained and unconstrained banks, but also banks not under a formal
action with a CAMEL rating of 3.
Our proxy for changes in monetary policy is based on the targeted
federal funds rate. The target federal funds rate series is taken from
Rudebusch (1995) and extended after September 1992 using the Federal
s De novo banks show rapid growth and tend to have extremely high capital ratios.
Since banks begin with all capital and no loans, and then quickly shrink capital and
increase loans, their behavior during their initial quarters of existence is not representative
of their behavior once they have matured. We thus omit the first eight quarters of
operations of a new bank.
6 Prior to 1982, there was no evidence of CAMEL 4 or 5 rated banks in New England.
Because the number of banks with CAMEL ratings shrinks dramatically as we move to
dates prior to the mid 1980s, in order to obtain a reasonable sample size we include all
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Reserve Bank of New York’s internal "Report of Open Market Opera-
tions and Money Market Conditions.’’7 The average of the federal funds
rate target during the quarter, first differenced, is used as our proxy for
changes in monetary policy. We include the contemporaneous value as
well as two lagged values of this variable in the regressions.
Capital shocks are measured as the change in the equity capital of a
bank category scaled by beginning-of-period assets. We include the
contemporaneous value as well as two lagged values of this variable in
the regressions. The regression equations also include the percentage
change in New England employment over the previous year, two lags of
the quarterly (CPI) inflation rate, and three quarterly seasonal dummy
variables as explanatory variables,s
Empirical Results
Since the role of bank lending is at the core of the "lending view,"
we focus the empirical analysis on the change in bank loans.9 Because of
the limited length of the time series for constrained banks (23 quarters),
the power of any test is likely to be weak. However, we are creating a
national data base that will enable us to identify constrained institutions
in earlier periods and to explore the disaggregated data at the level of the
individual bank. Thus, the empirical work at this time is quite prelimi-
nary, but it does provide a crude test of the model presented in the
earlier section.
Table 1 provides the results of comparing the effects of changes in
monetary policy and capital shocks on loan growth from 1989:II to
1994:IV. The results are shown for the unconstrained, constrained, and
total bank samples, with the results of both ordinary least squares (OLS)
and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation techniques reported. We
7 From October 1979 until January 1984, no explicit federal funds target is available
because the Federal Reserve was formally setting a reserves target. Since any reserves
target should imply a federal funds target, we use the average quarterly federal funds rate
during the reserve targeting period.
8 Because the short length of the time series for the constrained bank sample severely
restricts our degrees of freedom, we limit our set of explanatory variables to contain at
most only two lagged values. However, we did consider as many as four lagged values in
regressions for the unconstrained bank sample estimated over the entire sample period,
obtaining results that were qualitatively the same as those obtained when the set of
explanatory variables was limited to two lagged values.
9 Ideally, we would use a measure of new loans originated, that is, lending, rather
than the change in loans outstanding in a bank’s portfolio. The change in loans differs
from lending because the loans on a bank balance sheet are affected by loan charge-offs,
conversions of real estate loans to OREO, and net loan sales. Unfortunately, these data are
not available for our sample period. However, in an earlier study that covered a shorter
sample period when the data were available, we did make such adjustments (Peek and
Rosengren 1995c), finding that the responses to formal actions were similar for the change
in loans and measures of net new lending.64 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren
Table 1
The Effects of Monetary Policy and Capital Shocks on Loan Growtha
1989:11 to 1994:1V
Variable
Unconstrained Banks     Constrained Banks
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Total Bank Sample
OLS    2SLS
CFF -.909 - 1.341 -2,378 -2.380 -.803 -.917
(.48) (.68) (1.44) (1.44) (.80) (.89)
CFF(-1) -.466 -.135 1.290 1,293 -.175 -.074
(.28) (.08) (.91) (.911) (.21) (.08)
CFF(-2) ,298 ,084 3,272" 3.26* 2,922** 2,850**
(.20) (.05) (2.37) (2.36) (3.80) (3.63)
CEQ 2,009 1.054 1.181"* 1.814"* 3.222** 2.947**
(.93) (.45) (3.38) (3.18) (3.77) (2.92)
CEQ(-1) -.216 -.253 3.471"* 3.471"* -.133 -.162
(.07) (.09) (4.67) (4.67) (.12) (.14)
CEQ(-2) .098 -.323 .427 .427 1.086 1.057
(.02) (.07) (,61) (.61) (1.10) (1.07)
~CFF - 1.077 - 1.392 2.184 2.182 1.944 1.859
(.51) (.65) (1.10) (1.10) (1.79) (1.68)
~,CEQ 1.891 .477 5.717** 5.712** 4.176* 3.84*
(.31) (.07) (4.69) (4.62) (2.25) (1.95)
~2 .0794 .0615 ,799 .799 .818 ,816
SER .0163 .0164 .0166 .0166 .093 .093
DW 1.986 2.027 2.481 2.482 1,918 1.983
"Each regression also included a set of three seasonal dummy variables, two lagged values of the CPI
inflation rate, and the percentage change in New England employment over the previous year. Absolute
values of t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at the 5 percent confidence level.
**Significant at the 1 percent confidence lever.
use two-stage least squares techniques to account for the possible
endogeneity of the contemporaneous value of the change in bank equity
capital. We use as instruments each of the other explanatory variables in
the equation as well as an additional lagged value of the federal funds
target interest rate, the change in equity capital, and the inflation rate,
and two lagged values of both the change in other real estate owned and
the change in loan loss reserves, each scaled by total assets. The OLS
and 2SLS results are qualitatively similar.
The model implies that an increase in the federal funds target rate
should have a negative effect on loans in the unconstrained bank sample
and a positive effect for constrained banks. Or, if taken less literally, the
relative implication of the model is that unconstrained banks should
reduce loans by more than constrained banks in response to a tighteningBANK LENDING AND TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY 65
of monetary policy. Table 1 shows that the sum of the three coefficients
on the change in the federal funds target rate (CFF, CFF(-1), and
CFF(-2)) is negative for the unconstrained banks and positive for the
constrained banks, although neither sum is significantly different from
zero at the 5 percent confidence level. With respect to the individual
coefficients, only the second lagged value of CFF in the constrained
sample is significant. Still, these results highlight the differences in the
estimated impact of monetary policy changes operating through con-
strained as compared to unconstrained banks, implying that the net
impact of monetary policy at any given time may be quite sensitive to
the health of the banking sector and the share of banks facing binding
capital constraints.
For the total sample, the sum of the CFF coefficients is positive and
significant only at the 10 percent confidence level, although the second
lagged value is again highly significant. Thus, the results for the total
sample appear to mimic those of the constrained, rather than the
unconstrained, sample. If one were to base conclusions about the
presence of an operational lending channel on this sample, the lending
view would be rejected. Yet, it appears that the results from the total
sample reflect only the fact that through much of this period, a
significant proportion of loans were with capital-constrained banks.
The results for capital shocks are also consistent with the predic-
tions of the model. The sum of the coefficients on the change in equity
capital (CEQ) is positive in each case, and much larger (and significant
at the 1 percent confidence level) for the constrained bank sample.
Again, the total sample results mimic those for the constrained sample.
The adjusted R2 is much higher for the constrained sample than
for the unconstrained sample. The much better fit is not surprising,
given the earlier equations. For constrained banks, little other than
capital ratios and the interest sensitivity of transactions accounts deter-
mines loan growth, while at unconstrained banks, idiosyncratic charac-
teristics such as the conditions in the local lending and deposit markets
(as reflected, for example, in the values off1 and g1 for a particular bank)
may be much more important.
One should keep in mind that with only 23 quarters of data, the
power of the statistical test is low. Nonetheless, the results are broadly
consistent with the simple model from the previous section. Moreover,
the evidence highlights the fact that ignoring the differing responses of
constrained and unconstrained banks potentially can affect the size of
the impact of monetary policy on the economy and the ability to find
evidence of an operational lending channel in aggregate data.
Table 2 shows the effects of monetary policy and capital shocks on
loan growth for the unconstrained bank sample for the entire 1976:II to
1994:IV period. For this specification, we have omitted the 1980:II-1981:II
observations to avoid the effects of the Carter credit controls on66 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren
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a Each regression also included a set of three seasonal dummy variables, two lagged values of the CPI
inflation rate, and the percentage change in New England employment over the previous year. Absolute
values of t-statistics in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5 percent confidence level.
** Significant at the 1 percent confidence level.
contemporaneous and lagged data, the 1984:I observation because of
discontinuities in the call report data, and the 1986:IV and 1987:I
observations because of the effects on the timing of investment and
loans associated with the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
For the entire unconstrained bank sample, the sum of the coeffi-
cients on the federal funds target rate is negative and statistically
significant at the I percent confidence level. Furthermore, the coefficient
sums for both the OLS and 2SLS specifications are in the same range as
those for the 1989:II to 1994:W sample in Table 1, being only slightly
larger in absolute value. The sums of the coefficients on the change in
capital are positive, but not significantly different from zero.
The Durbin-Watson statistics are low, indicating that the equations
for the full sample may be misspecified. However, when the equations
are reestimated allowing the coefficients on CFF and CEQ during theBANK LENDING AND TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY 67
period after 1989:I to differ from those in the earlier period, no evidence
is found of serial correlation in the error term. A Chow test splitting the
sample at 1989:I produces an F-statistic of 2.82, significant at the 1
percent confidence level. However, it appears that it is the difference
between the CEQ coefficients across the two subperiods rather than
those for CFF that accounts for the low Durbin-Watson statistics. The
F-statistic for the test of CFF coefficient equality across the two subpe-
riods is only 0.79, while that for CEQ is 11.05, significant at the I percent
confidence level. This suggests problems in treating the predominantly
positive capital shocks during the earlier subperiod in the same way as
the predominantly negative capital shocks that occurred during the later
subperiod, even at banks that were not capital-constrained.
CONCLUSION
This paper highlights the importance of considering regulatory
factors when investigating the size and nature of the impact of monetary
policy on the economy. Since monetary policy operates through the
banking sector, one must take into consideration the effects of regula-
tory policy on the banking sector, as well as the sector’s general health,
to be able to predict bank responses to a change in monetary policy. In
particular, one must recognize that banks may face not only a binding
reserve requirement but also a binding capital requirement. In a simple
one-period model, we show that capital-constrained and unconstrained
banks are likely to react differently to both monetary policy and capital
shocks. By constructing time series data for constrained and uncon-
strained bank samples in New England, we find some evidence consis-
tent with the implications of our model.
While the econometrics are preliminary and the power of the tests
is restricted by the absence of a constrained bank sample prior to 1989,
we find evidence that monetary policy effects operating through uncon-
strained banks should be expected to have a stronger effect on the
economy compared to the effects transmitted through capital-constrained
banks. This suggests that the large number of capital-constrained banks
in New England in the early 1990s may have played an important role in
the slow recovery of this region from the 1990 recession. We also find
evidence that unconstrained banks behaved in a manner consistent with
an operational lending channel. Furthermore, we find that evidence
from aggregate data for all banks for the most recent period yields
results consistent with the constrained bank sample, making one more
likely to reject the hypothesis of an operational lending channel.
To fully test the importance of capital constraints on the impact of
monetary policy, we need to expand our sample nationwide to cover a
longer time period containing a sufficient number of constrained banks
to make the constrained-unconstrained bank comparison sharper. We68 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren
are currently constructing a national panel data set that will examine
differences in bank behavior over business cycles and regulatory re-
gimes. However, this initial work does support the contention that the
transmission of monetary policy must be considered in the context of
regulatory as well as monetary policy shocks.
References
Bernanke, Ben S. and Alan S. Blinder 1988. "Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand." The
American Economic Review, AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 78, pp. 435-39.
~.. 1992. "The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary Transmission." The
American Economic Review, vol. 82, pp. 901-21.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Cara S. Lown. 1991. "The Credit Crunch." Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, No. 2, pp. 205-39.
Fazzari, Steven M., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce Petersen. 1988. "Financing Constraints
and Corporate Investment." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1, pp. 141-95.
Gertler, Mark and Simon Gilchrist. 1994. "Monetary Policy, Business Cycles and the
Behavior of Small Manufacturing Firms." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 109, Issue
2, May, pp. 309-40.
Gertler, Mark and R. Glenn Hubbard. 1988. "Financial Factors in Business Fluctuations."
In Financial Market Volatility: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Recommendations, pp.
33-71. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Hancock, Diana and James A. Wilcox. 1994. "Bank Capital and the Credit Crunch: The
Roles of Risk-Weighted and Unweighted Capital Regulations." Journal of the American
Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 22, Spring, pp. 59-94.
James, Christopher. 1987. "Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans." Journal of
Financial Economics, vol. 19, pp. 217-35.
Kashyap, Anil K. and Jeremy C. Stein. 1994. "Monetary Policy and Bank Lending." In
Monetary Policy, edited by N. Gregory Mankiw, pp. 221-56. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
--. 1995. "The Impact of Monetary Policy on Bank Balance Sheets." Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 42, June, pp. 151-95.
Kashyap, Anil K., Jeremy C. Stein and David W. Wilcox. 1993. "Monetary Policy and
Credit Conditions: Evidence from the Composition of External Finance." The American
Economic Review, vol. 83, March, pp. 78-98.
Miron, Jeff, Christina Romer, and David Weil. 1994. "Historical Perspectives on the
Monetary Transmission Mechanism." In Monetary Policy, edited by N. Gregory
Mankiw, pp. 263--306. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Oliner, Stephen and Glenn Rudebusch. 1993. "Is There a Bank Credit Channel for
Monetary Policy?" Working Paper, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.
Peek, Joe and Eric S. Rosengren. 1995a. "The Capital Crunch: Neither a Borrower Nor a
Lender Be." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 27, no. 3 (August), pp. 625-38.
--. 1995b. "Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch." Journal of Banking and Finance,
vol. 19, no. I (June), pp. 679-92.
--. 1995c. "Banks and the Availability of Small Business Loans." Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston Working Paper 95-1, January.
--. 1995d. "Prompt Corrective Action Legislation: Does It Make a Difference?"
Unpublished manuscript, May.
--. 1995e. "Bank Regulatory Agreements in New England." New England Economic
Review, May/June, pp. 15-24.
Romer, Christina D. and David H. Romer. 1990. "New Evidence on the Monetary
Transmission Mechanism." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1, pp. 149-213.
--. 1993. "Credit Channel or Credit Actions? An Interpretation of the Postwar
Transmission Mechanism." In Changing Capital Markets: Implications for Monetary
Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp. 71-116.
Rudebusch, Glenn. 1995. "Federal Reserve Interest Rate Targeting, Rational Expectations,
and the Term Structure." Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 35, April, pp. 245-74.The interesting paper by Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren is a
contribution to the debate over the so-called "lending view" of the
monetary transmission mechanism. As I elaborate below, the lending
view channel for monetary policy requires that some group of borrowers
be "bank-dependent" and that the central bank be able to affect the
supply of bank loans through monetary policy. The essential idea put
forth by the authors is that comparing loan responses of "capital-
constrained" and "capital-unconstrained" banks to changes in mone-
tary policy offers a way to test the second requirement of the lending
view. 1
Following the Peek and Rosengren paper, my remarks are orga-
nized around five questions: Is an effect of monetary policy on bank
loan supply necessary or sufficient to corroborate the importance of
capital-market imperfections in spending decisions? Second, does the
authors’ model of bank behavior illustrate the lending view? Third, why
study lending in the New England region? Fourth, are the empirical
tests convincing? Finally, where do we go from here?
PUTTING THE LENDING VIEW IN CONTEXT
Let me begin by characterizing the traditional "money view" of the
monetary transmission mechanism.2 In this view, financial intermedi-
*Russell L. Carson Professor of Economics and Finance and Senior Vice Dean,
Graduate School of Business, Columbia University.
~ The other requirement is not addressed in the paper (but see the paper by
Himmelberg and Morgan in this volume).
2 More detailed descriptions of alternative monetary transmission mechanisms can
be found in Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Hubbard (1995b).70 R. Glenn Hubbard
aries ("banks") offer no special services on the asset side of their balance
sheet. On the liability side of their balance sheet, banks perform a
special role; the banking system creates money by issuing demand
deposits. Underlying assumptions about borrowers is the idea that
capital structures do not influence real decisions. To keep the story
simple, suppose that there are two assets--"money" and "bonds." In a
monetary contraction, the central bank reduces reserves, limiting the
banking system’s ability to sell deposits. Depositors must then hold
more bonds and less money in their portfolios. If prices do not
instantaneously adjust to changes in the money supply, the fall in
household money holdings represents a decline in real money balances.
To restore equilibrium, the real interest rate on bonds increases, raising
the user cost of capital for a range of planned investment activities, and
interest-sensitive spending falls.
The search for a richer transmission mechanism reflects two con-
cerns. The "macro" concern is that cyclical movements in aggregate
demand appear too large to be explained by monetary policy actions,
which have not generally led to large, prolonged changes in real interest
rates. This has pushed some macroeconomists to identify financial
factors in propagating relatively small shocks, factors that correspond to
"accelerator" models that explain investment data relatively well.
The "’micro" concern relates to the growing literature studying
information imperfections in insurance and credit markets. In this line of
inquiry, problems of asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders lead to a gap between the costs of external finance and internal
finance. The notion of costly external finance stands in contrast to the
more complete markets approach underlying the conventional interest-
rate channel, which does not consider links between real and financial
decisions.
While a review of this literature is beyond the scope of these
remarks, let me mention three common empirical implications. The first
is that uncollateralized external finance is more expensive than internal
finance. Second, the spread between the costs of external and internal
finance varies inversely with the borrower’s net worth--internal funds
and collateralizable resources--relative to the amount of funds required.
Third, an adverse shock to a borrower’s net worth increases the cost of
external finance and decreases the ability of the borrower to implement
investment, employment, and production plans. This channel provides
a "financial accelerator" magnifying an initial shock to net worth.
One can extend this argument to include a channel for mone-
tary policy. In the money view, policy actions affect the overall level
of interest rates and interest-sensitive spending. The crux of models of
information-related financial frictions is a gap between the costs of
external and internal finance for many borrowers. It is possible for
monetary policy (open market operations or regulatory actions) to affectDISCUSSION 71
this gap. Two such channels have been identified: financial constraints
on borrowers (a "balance sheet" channel), and the existence of "bank-
dependent" borrowers (the "lending" channel). A significant body of
empirical research supports the former channel (see the review in
Hubbard 1995a). The latter channel is the one related to the Peek-
Rosengren analysis. Specifically, Peek and Rosengren focus on a neces-
sary precondition for the lending channel, namely, that the central bank
can affect the supply of bank loans.
Two significant concerns have been raised about the precondition
that central bank actions can affect loan supply. The first is the difficulty
in identifying exogenous changes in banks’ ability to lend. The second
is the need to explain why it is cosily to substitute nontransactions
deposits or new equity for transaction deposits in order to fund loans. I
discuss these concerns below in the context of the authors’ model.
MODEL OF BANK BEHAVIOR
The model of bank decisions presented extends earlier work by the
authors. The basic idea is to use balance sheet relationships at a point
in time to examine comparative statics (the response of bank loans to
changes in the target federal funds rate or to changes in equity capital).
Peek and Rosengren stress three predictions. First, capital shocks
generate (directionally) different effects on CD borrowing for "con-
strained" and "unconstrained" banks. Second, policy shocks (changes
in the funds rate target) generate (directionally) different effects on loan
supply for constrained and unconstrained banks. Third, total deposits in
constrained banks do not change in response to a change in the funds
rate target, while total deposits in unconstrained banks fall in response
to an increase in the funds rate target. The authors argue that capital
constraints are a more useful way to group banks than bank size,
because the values of model parameters that govern the response of
loans to changes in the funds rate target and changes in equity capital
likely vary across bank size groups.
The authors need the model really only to establish that an effect
of monetary contraction on loan supply is greater for banks with no
binding capital constraint than for banks facing a binding capital con-
straint. This point can be illustrated somewhat more simply and in a
way that avoids counterintuitive implications--for example, that loans
by constrained banks rise in response to a monetary tighteningo3
s It is the difference in the effects that is important for the subsequent empirical work.
The prediction of the model that loans by capital-constrained banks will rise in response
to a monetary tightening is an artifact of the assumed form of the securities demand
relationship.72 R. Glenn Hubbard
To see this, let me reformulate the model articulated by Peek and
Rosengren; variable definitions match those in their paper. In the
example below, I make two assumptions different from those in the
Peek and Rosengren paper: The interest rate on demand deposits is
zero, and the loan market is competitive. Banks maximize profits subject
to a reserve requirement, liquidity constraint, balance sheet identity,
and capital adequacy constraint:4
max [(rLL -- O)L + rsS - rDCD] (Profit maximization)
subject to:
(Reserve requirement)
R + S :~ ho + hI DD (Liquidity constraint)
R + L + S=CD+ DD+ K (Balance sheet identity)
(Capital adequacy constraint)S
If all constraints bind except the capital constraint, rL = 8 + rD +
(r~)CD, where rb = (1/fl) in their model. If r~ = 0 (h --~ ~), then the loan
rate equals the CD rate; absent increasing marginal costs of CD financ-
ing, no scope remains for the lending view. When r~) > 0, banks face a
rising marginal cost of CD finance. In the short run, if (rL -- rr)) does not
change, the volume of CD borrowing is pinned down; a decrease in
reserves of $1 reduces deposits by (l/a), loans by (1 - hl)/a, and
securities by (hl/O~ - 1). In equilibrium, the loan-CD spread may change,
depending in part on the size of rb (or f~). The bottom line is that when
loans and CDs are imperfect substitutes, both (rL -- rr~) and loan supply
will be affected by shocks to reserves.
The capital constraint may bind if raising additional equity is costly
under asymmetric information. In this case, the liquidity constraint will
not bind, because banks hold more securities than required for liquidity
(capital constrains the volume of loans). With loans tied down by the
capital constraint, changes in the bank’s portfolio in response to a
change in reserves occur through changes in securities holdings.
While some caution in interpretation is in order (for example,
because these exercises ignore dynamics and the possibility of expected
future constraints), such simple models illustrate the potential useful-
ness of capital constraints for tests of whether monetary policy affects
bank loan supply.
a As do Peek and Rosengren, I abstract from the more complicated structure of capital
and leverage requirements in practice.
s This assumes a zero capital requirement on securities.DISCUSSION 73
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Peek and Rosengren note that Kashyap and Stein (1995) fail to find
much of an effect from capital constraints on the lending channel in their
analysis of data for the nation as a whole. While capital-asset ratios rose
over the late 1980s and 1990s (and through the 1990-91 recession) for the
nation as a whole, they fell in New England over the period from 1989
through mid 1991, increasing sharply thereafter. Hence, the New
England region may offer a better laboratory for studying the interaction
of capital constraints and the lending channel.
While the intuition behind this regional focus is clear, I have a
concern: The period of falling bank capital-asset ratios corresponds to a
period in which the net worth of many New England borrowers
(especially in real estate) is falling, so that it is difficult to isolate a causal
link between changes in bank capital and bank lending. I return to this
point later.
EMPIRICAL TESTS AND ~’~ESULTS
The authors’ tests use quarterly Call Report data for New England
banks. To measure "capital constraints," they use the presence or
absence of a formal regulatory action, supplemented by information on
supervisory CAMEL ratings (for example, for institutions about to be
closed or merged with other banks). Before discussing the results, two
pitfalls in using the data should be acknowledged (as they are by the
authors): the shortness of the time period for the constrained bank
sample (1989 to 1994), and the use as a control group of an uncon-
strained bank sample including data from an earlier period (1977 to
1994)o With respect to the latter point, a better idea would be to use a
control group drawn from other regions in the United States.
The paper’s empirical results are presented in its Tables I and 2. The
results reported in Table 1 examine the response of loans in the con-
strained and unconstrained subsamples to changes in the federal funds
rate target and changes in equity. Loans by unconstrained banks
respond more to changes in the federal funds rate target than those by
constrained banks, though the differences are not statistically signifi-
cant. Equity changes have a larger positive effect on loans for the con-
strained subgroup.
Peek and Rosengren suggest that findings in Table I do not support
the lending view, but I have two concerns. First, the fact that "total
sample" patterns follow "constrained sample" patterns might simply
6 I am, of course, discounting the explanation that the research program is supported
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.74 R. Glenn Hubbard
indicate that more loans were made by (large) capital-constrained banks.
Second, the test is-not really one of the "lending view" but of the
relationship between changes in the funds rate and bank lending. More
convincing differences between the two groups are observed for
changes in equity capital. That capital shocks affect lending by con-
strained banks is certainly reasonable but, again, this is not a test of the
lending view per se.
Table 2 reports results for the longer-period sample of uncon-
strained banks. In these tests, the change in the federal funds rate target
has a negative and statistically significant effect on loans; changes in
capital have an insignificant effect on loans. Even this evidence is
somewhat difficult to interpret. Large standard errors make it difficult
to use the results as a benchmark to compare against Table 1. Again, a
comparison of results from different regions might be more fruitful.
The paper concludes noting "evidence that unconstrained banks
behaved in a manner consistent with the lending channel." Perhaps. On
a narrow level, the standard errors are really too large to make
convincing the claim that an increase in the federal funds rate target
reduces bank loan supply. On a broad level, neither for Table I nor for
Table 2 can one be sure that the authors are estimating loan supply rather
than loan demand. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests potentially prom-
ising future research with the national panel data set.
WHERE DO WE Go FROM HERE?
Because the "’lending view" involves assumptions about capital-
market imperfections for both banks and borrowers, more complete
tests of the lending view require analysis of banks and borrowers jointly.
In an ideal world, data matching borrower, loan, and lender character-
istics could be used to sort out "lending view" and "balance sheet view"
channels. Short of that, research could focus on two questions. First, are
small or low-net-worth borrowers more likely to be the customers of
constrained banks? Second, do low-net-worth firms have limited oppor-
tunities to substitute credit from unconstrained financial institutions
when cut off by constrained financial institutions? Researchers have
begun considering these questions,7 and I suspect we will have much
more micro evidence about the validity of the lending view in the near
future.
7 See, for example, Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1995) and Himmelberg and
Morgan (1995).DISCUSSION 75
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151-95.The paper by Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren addresses an impor-
tant and timely issue: Do binding bank capital requirements affect the
way monetary policy is transmitted? Using a simple model of the
banking firm, the authors show that capital-constrained banks will
respond to monetary policy shocks differently than unconstrained banks.
Specifically, they show that the so-called "lending channel" for mone-
tary policy is more important for banks that are unconstrained by capital
requirements than for banks subject to binding capital requirements.
Using a sample of New England banks, the authors provide preliminary
empirical evidence consistent with the predictions of their model.
The major contribution of the paper, in my opinion, is its demon-
stration that the regulatory environment in which banks operate can
have an important influence on the way monetary policy is transmitted
to the real economy. However, just how capital requirements affect the
relationship between loan growth and monetary policy is, I believe,
more complicated than the predictions of the authors’ simple model
suggest. Specifically, the authors’ conclusion, that the lending channel
does not operate when banks are capital constrained, is the result of
several assumptions that are likely to be violated in the real world. My
comments will focus on the implications of relaxing these assumptions.
BACKGROUND
For a lending channel for monetary policy to operate, several con-
ditions must be met. First, banks must view reservable transaction ac-
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counts and nontransaction accounts as not perfect substitutes for
one another. In Peek and Rosengren’s model (as in similar work by
Kashyap and Stein 1995), this is accomplished through assuming that
the volume of transaction deposits for individual banks is determined
by monetary policy (and is not a decision variable for individual banks).
In contrast, the amount of CDs and other nontransaction deposits is
assumed to be determined by the interest rate an individual bank
pays.
A second condition for a lending channel is that loans and securities
be imperfect substitutes in bank portfolios. In the lending channel
literature, securities are assumed to be held as a precaution against
deposit outflows. Loans, on the other hand, are assumed to be illiquid
and acquired in less than perfectly competitive markets. Peek and
Rosengren employ a similar set of assumptions in their model, except
that they assume that securities are held as a fixed proportion of demand
deposits. As I will discuss in a moment, this assumption is peculiar
given that, with leverage-based capital requirements, securities are also
held as a precaution against capital shocks.
If these first two conditions are met, it is straightforward to show
that monetary policy will affect loan supply. For example, consider a
decrease in reserves that causes a decline in demand deposits. So long
as the decline in demand deposits is not completely offset by a de-
cline in securities holdings, the bank must rely more on costly exter-
nal debt (CDs and other nontransaction accounts). This increase in
bank funding costs in turn results in a decline in the supply of loans.
To complete the story, the decrease in the supply of bank loans will
affect aggregate investment and output, if firms view bank loans and
other forms of external financing as imperfect substitutes for one
another.
HOW HAVE REGULATORY CHANGES
AFFECTED THE LENDING CHANNEL?
Assuming the conditions for a lending channel are met, how have
regulatory changes over the past decade affected its operation? Two
bank regulation changes appear to be particularly important (but work-
ing, perhaps, at cross-purposes). First, beginning in the late 1980s,
implicit deposit guarantees on large uninsured bank liabilities were
significantly curtailed. Specifically, the passage of FDICIA in 1991
signaled the formal abandonment (in theory) of the extension of implicit
deposit insurance to large deposits and nondeposit liabilities of com-
mercial banks. Since it is reasonable to assume that implicit insurance
had a greater effect on the cost of CDs and other potentially information-
sensitive deposits than on the cost of transaction accounts, the curtail-78 Christopher James
ment of deposit insurance should reduce the degree of substitutability
between demand deposits and other sources of deposit financing. The
reduction in the degree of substitutability in turn works to increase the
sensitivity of loan supply to changes in monetary policy, thereby
strengthening the importance of the lending channel.
The second set of regulatory changes affecting the lending channel
were changes in capital requirements. Specifically, risk-based capital
requirements were implemented, the required level of capital was
raised, and enforcement became more stringent, beginning in 1990. The
implications of these changes are the primary focus of the authors’
paper. While I agree with the paper’s conclusion that binding capital
requirements serve to decrease the sensitivity of loan supply to mone-
tary policy, the authors" conclusion that capital-constrained banks
respond to monetary policy in a qualitatively different way than uncon-
strained banks is, I believe a special case. In particular, this result holds
only when risk-based capital requirements are binding.
Capital requirements affect the lending channel through their effect
on the substitutability of loans for securities in a bank’s portfolio. One of
the least well understood parts of bank portfolio management, I believe,
is why banks hold government securities. Models of lending channels
(including the present model) generally assume that banks hold securi-
ties as a precaution against deposit withdrawals. In these models,
securities are a substitute for external debt financing. The greater the
cost of external debt financing and the greater the volatility in the supply
of demand deposits, the greater the demand for securities as an in-
ventory of liquidity.
With capital requirements based on overall leverage, there is a
second reason to hold securities: as a buffer against capital shocks. In
particular, with capital requirements based on total assets, banks can
respond to a capital shock by selling securities and shrinking their asset
base. The demand for securities should therefore depend on the
volatility of bank earnings or capital as well as the cost associated with
a binding capital requirement. In summary, one advantage of holding
securities when operating under leverage-based requirements is that
securities reduce the dependence of loan growth on internally generated
capital.
In contrast, with binding risk-based capital standards, securities can
no longer buffer loan growth from capital shocks. Specifically, since
government securities have a zero risk weight, liquidating securities
does not free up capital to fund loans. While the authors focus on the
effects of binding leverage requirements, their assumption that securi-
ties holdings are a fixed proportion of transaction deposits effectively
means that "risk-weighted" capital requirements are binding. In a more
general model, such as Kashyap and Stein’s (1995), the lending channelDISCUSSION 79
of monetary policy continues to operate even though leverage-based
capital requirements are binding. 1
To summarize, the effect of capital requirements on the transmis-
sion of monetary policy depends on whether the risk-weighted capital
requirement is binding or not. The greater emphasis on risk-weighted
capital requirements since the 1989-90 period is likely to reduce the
importance of the lending channel for capital-constrained banks. I think
this explains the authors’ preliminary results concerning the absence of
a lending channel among capital-constrained banks beginning in 1989.
The introduction of risk-based capital requirements may also explain the
structural shift the authors find for unconstrained banks beginning in
1989 (see their Table 2).
Let me conclude by suggesting a way of empirically determining the
importance of risk-related capital requirements and, indirectly, the
operation of the lending channel of monetary policy. As I mentioned
earlier, a necessary condition for a lending channel is that external
financing is costly relative to internally generated funds and demand
deposits. As a result, one would expect bank loan growth to be ~ensitive
to the amount of internally generated funds. I would also expect loan
growth at capital-deficient banks to be more sensitive to internally
generated additions to capital. Moreover, whether a bank’s security
holdings affect the sensitivity of loan growth to internally generated
funds will depend on whether the leverage requirement or the risk-
based capital requirement is binding. If the leverage requirement is
binding, then I would expect the sensitivity of loan growth to internally
generated funds to vary inversely with a bank’s holdings of securities.
On the other hand, finding no relation between securities holdings and
the sensitivity of loan growth to internally generated funds would be
evidence that the risk-based capital standard is binding. A finding that
risk-based requirements are binding would also suggest that the lending
channel is relatively unimportant (since bank loan growth is restricted
by the amount of equity capital).
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